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Abstract 
Despite widespread beliefs that the United States has not used chemical weapons since the 
distant past of World War I, this study suggests a more complicated history by examining U.S. 
use of herbicides and incapacitating gases in the Vietnam War and its use of herbicides in the 
"War on Drugs." This article places such use of toxic violence within a context of U.S. 
hegemony, by which U.S. officials have used contested forms of violence to secure geopolitical 
goals, but have also been pressured to comply with humanitarian norms or-when there is a gap 
between norms and state policy-to do legitimating work in order to maintain domestic and 
international consent. Based on case study analysis of archival and secondary sources, this 
article identifies three main techniques U.S. officials use to legitimate contested forms of 
violence. These techniques are defensive categorization, humanitizing discourse, and surrogacy. 
Keywords: legitimation, hegemony, humanitarian norms, chemical weapons, Vietnam War, War 
on Drugs 
The world economic and political system has long been uneasily saddled with the ideology of 
centrist liberalism, a "geoculture" that promises incremental and moderate reforms to guarantee 
political and social rights (Wallerstein 1995, 2011). One important component of global 
liberalism has been the century-old effort to reform and humanize war, in which state 
govermnents and civil society actors have sought to promote humanitarian norms, formalized 
through international treaty-making, as a means of prohibiting certain forms of state violence that 
have been identified as especially indiscriminate or inhumane. But like the political ideology of 
liberalism as a whole, this is often irreconcilable with the realities of the world-system, which is 
premised upon the threat and actual use of mass violence between states as they vie with one 
another over territory and as they work to promote the continuous accumulation of capital ( see 
Arrighi 2010). 
This contradiction - between liberal humanitarianism and the realities of the structure of 
the world-system - poses significant challenges to policymakers, especially those in the United 
States where, as a hegemonic power, the contradiction may become most acute. As a hegemonic 
power, the United States has had disproportionate capacity to shape and benefit from the 
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contours of the world's political economy in the past half century 1 (Wallerstein 2004; Arrighi 
2010). Exercising hegemony, however, necessitates more than simply achieving military and 
economic dominance (Arrighi and Silver 1999). It also means that a global power must earn the 
consent of the governed by providing global moral leadership and making a convincing case that 
it represents a general-as opposed to its own particular-interest in world affairs ( Arrighi and 
Silver 1999), which in contemporary times has often meant upholding broadly-shared 
humanitarian norms. While it is clear that both coercion, achieved through real or threatened 
military violence, and consent, achieved through cultural appeal, are both necessary components 
of hegemony, it is important to ask, when these needs are contradictory, which trumps the other, 
and why? Through the course of this article, I work to answer these questions in a case-study of 
U.S. toxic weapons policy from 1961 to the present time. 
There is a longstanding and broadly-shared norm that stigmatizes and prohibits the use of 
chemical weapons (Price 1997). It is widely presumed that the United States has not utilized 
chemical weapons since World War I, after which they were outlawed and condemned by the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925. But, as is documented here, actual events are much more complicated 
and tend to contradict conventional understandings. In this paper, I make the analytic distinction 
between toxic violence and chemical weapons. Toxic violence is a broad category in which 
implements of force are used primarily for their chemically toxic qualities. 2 Chemical weapons, 
however, are a subset within the larger category of toxic munitions that have been internationally 
banned as such. So, while it might appear that the strong norm expressed in the Geneva 
Protocol-first signed by the U.S. in 1925 and then ratified in 1975-has steered the U.S. away 
from the use of toxic violence when it outlawed the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous, or other 
gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices," an examination of U.S. policy tells a 
different story. 
In this study of U.S. policy development regarding toxic violence, I make the case that 
long-standing and broadly-shared humanitarian norms, even those regarding chemical weapons, 
have not necessarily prevented the U.S. from using stigmatized or prohibited forms of violence 
in its pursuit of hegemony. Rather, I argue that the United States has sought to maintain a 
distinction between certain forms of toxic violence. On the one hand, the United States has 
abided by international norms regarding chemical weapons by abdicating the use of immediately 
lethal chemicals. Doing so was certainly in the United States' hegemonic interest because it 
strengthened efforts to prevent militarily-weak nations from developing their own chemical 
weapon stockpiles that could be real deterrents to invasion from a Western power (Price 1997). 
On the other hand, the United States has not strictly complied with the norm by abandoning all 
forms of toxic violence, but has widely used other chemicals in wars and violent conflicts, such 
as the herbicides and incapacitating gases widely used in Vietnam, as well as herbicides used in 
the "War on Drugs." The cases in this study show, however, that any use of toxic violence is 
contested and condemned as a breach of international humanitarian norms. Its use, therefore, 
requires that U.S. officials do legitimating work. 
1 The author certainly acknowledges the contemporary decline of US. power, which has lead notable world-systems 
researchers to determine that the US. no longer remains a hegemonic state (Wallerstein 2003; Arrighi 2010). 
However, this paper mainly focuses on the periods between 1961 and 2000, in which it can safely be said that the 
U.S. exercised hegemony, even if in a period of decline. 
2 While the lead in bullets or the depleted uranium in anti-armor shells is chemically toxic, neither is used primarily 
for its toxicity. Such weapons do not constitute methods of toxic violence by the definition used here. 
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The cases investigated here demonstrate that U.S. policymakers have consistently 
employed three main techniques of legitimation in efforts to justify, obfuscate, or distance 
themselves from uses of toxic violence: defensive categorization, humanitizing discourse, and 
surrogacy. Through defensive categorization, officials deny that the U.S. govermnent has 
violated an international standard. In doing so, officials work to normalize such contested 
violence by stressing its routine, everyday nature. Through what I call humanitizing discourse, 
officials emphasize the care taken to avoid humanitarian harm when the U.S. govermnent uses a 
contested form of violence, and indeed may even claim that the use of such violence has 
humanitarian benefits. Through surrogacy, the U.S. provides another state or armed group the 
means of carrying out contested acts of violence, providing U.S. officials some plausible 
deniability that they are responsible for any resulting violations of humanitarian norms. Such 
legitimating techniques may be very useful to officials working to manage the inherent 
contradictions of hegemony in our particular time. 
Managing the Contradictions of Hegemony 
According to Wallerstein (1995), the "ideological cement" of the world-economic system has 
been the geoculture of centrist liberalism, which has two fundamental components. First, centrist 
liberalism, like all forms of liberalism, proclaims the "sovereignty of the people." Second, it 
promises methodical reform of existing conditions to increase political and economic equality as 
a means toward its achievement (Wallerstein 2011 ). Centrist liberalism has legitimated global 
capitalism by providing a political program that promised concessions as a means of placating 
and controlling the "dangerous classes." However, it has always been at odds with, and 
continuously contradicted by, the structural realities of the world-system, which require stark 
inequalities between peoples and the continuous geopolitical rivalries between states 
(W allerstein 2003; 2011 ). 
Nowhere is this contradiction more apparent than that between the efforts to reform and 
"humanize" war in the past century and the reality of military violence during the same period. 
Beginning in the late 1800s, states and civil society actors sought to fulfill the promise of 
liberalism by reforming warfare through the introduction of a number of normative restraints, 
such as securing protections for captured or wounded soldiers, protecting civilian populations, 
enacting universal prohibitions on certain weapons, and even promoting disarmament (Roberts 
1994). While efforts toward disarmament failed, multilateral treaties emerged that have since 
come to be called the "Laws of War." These international agreements resulted in bans on certain 
kinds of weapons and, through the Geneva Conventions formalized between 1886 and 1929, 
sought to impose more general restraints on war-fighting (Roberts 1994). Altogether, the 
outcome of these liberal efforts to reform war is an international normative framework that 
attempts to outlaw certain forms of state violence, such as the use of chemical weapons, torture, 
and the deliberate targeting of civilians. Some scholars have argued that such international norms 
have had a real impact on state behavior (see Finnemore 1996; Price 1997; Wotipka and Tsutsui 
2008; Koo and Ramirez 2009). A careful study of U.S. violence may, however, require that such 
assertions be tempered. 
Certainly, the United States could not shrug off or ignore the emergence of humanitarian 
norms in its pursuit of hegemony during the twentieth century. Hegemony requires, after all, that 
a dominant nation exercise the global "moral leadership" necessary to garner the consent of a 
85 Journal of World-Systems Research 
critical mass of domestic and international political factions (Arrighi 2010). Likely for this 
reason, the United States became the "world spokesman for liberalism" during its era of 
hegemony, promoting the idea of the "rights of the people," including the notion that they should 
not be deprived of their most basic rights to life during times of war (Wallerstein 1995: 156). 
Furthermore, several scholars have argued that powerful nations work to establish global 
humanitarian norms as a means of controlling or diminishing the military capacities of weaker 
nations or insurgent non-state groups, as in the case of chemical weapons (Price 1997), 
landmines (Beier 2011), or the small arms trade (Stavrianakis 2011). Hegemony, however, 
requires more than an economically dominant nation's ability to exert global cultural leadership; 
it also requires the use of violent coercion (Arrighi 2010; see also Gramsci 1971). 
There are several reasons why military force is particularly important to the U.S. during 
its era of hegemony. First and foremost, the United States was called upon to secure 
"international order," including the maintenance of inequitable relationships between nations 
first forged through colonialism (Wallerstein 2004). Securing "international order" has often 
meant that the United States has used its military power to open and preserve access to foreign 
markets and to protect its own military and economic supremacy. It has also used its substantial 
military power as a threat or through actual belligerence in order to maintain access to valuable 
natural resources that are necessary for the continuous accumulation of capitalism (Klare 2004; 
Downey, Bonds, and Clark 2010). In sum, the period of U.S. hegemony has been one in which 
the U.S. military was continuously poised to use coercive violence to defend the established 
world order, and one in which it was often embroiled in one conflict or another somewhere 
around the globe. 
There is, therefore, a real contradiction that U.S. officials had to manage during the 
period of U.S. hegemony; in order to secure international and domestic consent, officials had to 
proclaim the values of liberalism and act to protect the "rights of the people," even in times of 
war. This presented some pressure to comply with international humanitarian norms that prohibit 
and stigmatize certain acts of violence that have been identified as especially cruel or harmful. 
On the other hand, ensuring U.S. hegemony required the consistent use of military force that, at 
times, resulted in widespread killings that deprived unarmed persons of their most basic right to 
exist. Such contradictions have typically been managed, which is to say actively suppressed, 
through appeals to "military necessity" and through the dehumanization of real or potential 
"enemies." Through these appeals, officials attempt to justify acts of egregious violence by 
claiming that they are necessary for victory or even survival. Through processes of 
dehumanization, aided and abetted by longstanding notions of white supremacy, state officials 
and other elites may portray enemy populations as subhuman, inhuman, or as being barbarous 
and therefore outside the bounds of civilization (Dower 1987; Steuter and Wills 2008). Such 
symbolic treatment of others may suppress the contradiction between the humanitarian norms 
that emerged during the period of liberal reformism and the brutal and altogether inhumane 
realities of actual state violence that characterize it. 
Though appeals to military necessity and the dehumanization of enemies have been 
important means by which the United States has historically legitimated wars and mass violence, 
they may not by themselves be sufficient in the contemporary era. This is particularly due to 
anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles that have countered dehumanization and sought to affirm 
the humanity of all persons, along with the development of global human rights networks that 
seek to publicize and shame state practices that violate international normative frameworks 
(Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Wallerstein 2004; Blau and Moncado 2005). Historical research 
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presented in this article indicates that the U.S. government has utilized three additional 
techniques to do legitimating work as a means of attempting to hide, distance itself from, or 
explain away perceived violations of international humanitarian norms. These techniques include 
defensive categorization, the use ofhumanitizing discourse, and surrogacy. 
Defensive Categorization 
Governments that are criticized for committing atrocities or violations of humanitarian norms 
often categorically deny all accusations (Cohen 2001). There are some situations, however, when 
certain facts about contested acts of state violence are undeniable and beyond dispute. In such 
instances, state officials often seek to place these acts and outcomes within an interpretative 
framework through which they would not be considered major violations of humanitarian norms 
(Cohen 2001 ). Defensive categorization is one such technique, by which U.S. governmental 
officials attempt to make the case that a certain act of state violence is quite different and 
altogether separate from another stigmatized category of violence. Instead, officials attempt to 
normalize such acts by stressing how similar they are to routine and commonplace behavior. 
Humanitizing Discourse 
U.S. officials may further attempt to legitimate contested forms of violence through the use of a 
humanitizing discourse, by which they may stress the extreme care that their military takes to 
avoid humanitarian harms when using contested weaponry. Of course, such claims are often 
misleading and may, in some situations, simply not be true. U.S. governmental officials may also 
use a humanitizing discourse in defense of contested forms of violence by stressing their alleged 
humanitarian benefits. For instance, wars are increasingly justified in recent times as being 
fought in the interest of human rights and democracy (Bricmont 2006). 
Surrogacy 
Through this legitimating technique, U.S. officials can direct client states to utilize weapons or 
violent practices that breach international humanitarian norms, often supplying these 
governments with the means to do so. Surrogacy provides the United States distance and/or the 
ability to argue that it is not ultimately responsible for any resulting violations of international 
standards committed by its adjuncts (Bonds 2012). 
Through the remainder of this article, I will examine three historical instances where the 
United States has used chemically toxic weapons from the 1960s to the present, documenting the 
consistency through which these three legitimating techniques were used. 
The U.S. Use and Legitimation of Toxic Violence 
It is widely presumed that the United States, like all Western nations, disavowed the use of 
chemical weapons in the aftermath of World War One and has not used them since. Richard 
Price (1995, 1997) tells one such story when arguing that there is a very powerful chemical 
weapons "taboo" in global political culture that has had a real impact on the development of state 
policy. Price argues that attention to this norm is necessary to explain why immediately lethal 
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chemical weapons-of the sort used during World War One-have not been used since by 
Western nations and, more generally, why chemical weapons have been used so little in recent 
times. Price argues that this is not simply due to a supposed lack of military utility, as chemical 
weapons could be used very effectively by modern militaries to kill large numbers of people and 
sow terror in an enemy population, which are outcomes often valued by military planners. 3 
To Price, the effectiveness of this norm has much to do with the political power of 
Western nations and their own military interests. Ever since a global norm stigmatizing chemical 
weapons was developed and formalized in global political culture, according to Price (1995: 95), 
it has "come to function as a symbol of the hierarchical relations of domination in the 
international system." The first nations to commit to the non-use of chemical weapons were 
"civilized" states and, as the argument goes, non-Western states banned their use in emulation 
(Price 1995). In the latter half of the century, however, Western nations foisted this normative 
restraint on the rest of the world when they stigmatized chemical weapons as "weapons of the 
weak" and the "poor man's bomb." According to Price, it made good military and geopolitical 
sense for Western states to pressure Third World nations to abandon chemical weapons 
stockpiles, because such weapons could pose a real, non-nuclear threat to Western military 
intervention (1995, 1997). 
But, according to the argument, in order to make this norm credible, powerful nations 
like the U.S. had to forgo the use of chemical weapons, even in situations when their use would 
have been militarily advantageous (Price 1997). There is some evidence to this effect (see Table 
1). First, the U.S. signed the Geneva Protocol in 1925, which prohibits nations from being the 
first to use chemical weapons in war, and later ratified the accord in 1975. 4 More recently, the 
United States ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, which is a stronger treaty that 
requires nations to eliminate their chemical weapon stockpiles. Perhaps more importantly, the 
United States has not used chemical agents intended to directly kill enemy soldiers through 
asphyxiation or by causing chemical burns since World War I. 
By looking more broadly at the U.S. history of toxic violence in order to draw out and 
examine political debates about what does and does not constitute a "chemical weapon," this 
paper builds on Price's analysis but also tells a more complicated story: one which indicates that 
even longstanding and broadly-shared humanitarian norms, such as that governing chemical 
weapons, do not strictly determine or entirely restrain the forms of violence the United States 
employs. The cases below demonstrate that herbicides and incapacitating gases used since 1961 
by the United States - as methods of violence in wars and conflicts - could quite plausibly be 
considered chemical weapons by the definition of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which sought to 
prohibit the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, 
materials, or devices." Archival evidence, for instance, shows that U.S. officials knew in advance 
that their use of herbicides to destroy foliage and food crops in hostile territories during the 
Vietnam War would be condemned as a form of chemical warfare, but chose to use the 
3 One objection to this argument might be the supposed risks that chemical weapons use might pose to friendly 
combatants, as frequently happened in World War I. However, this is not an inherent quality of chemical weapons 
because, with more advanced weapomy, they could be remotely delivered without fear of friendly exposure. 
4 Signing such an agreement does not, of course, make it legally binding without ratification. But it does signal an 
intent to ratify. At the very least, it is an acknowledgement made by US. officials of the existence of a global norm 
against chemical weapons. 
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Table 1: U.S. Policy on Toxic Weapons 
Year 
1925 
1941-1945 
1950-1953 
1961-1971 
1965-1972 
1969-present 
1975 
1997 
Event 
U.S. government signs Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the first use 
of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous 
liquids, materials or devices." 
Refrains from using chemical weapons in World War II. 
Refrains from using chemical weapons in Korean War. 
Uses large amounts of herbicides in Vietnam War as a defoliant and 
to destroy food crops. 
Uses large amounts of incapacitating gases in Vietnam, including 
tear gas, enhanced tear gas, and nauseating agents. 
Supports drug crop eradication with herbicides in-at various 
times-Mexico, Burma, Pakistan, Guatemala, Panama, Belize, and 
Columbia. 
Ratifies the Geneva Protocol. 
Ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits 
chemical warfare and commits all signatory nations to destroy their 
chemical weapons stockpiles. The Convention classifies 
incapacitants as prohibited weapons. 
chemicals regardless. And when the Nixon Administration sought to formally interpret the 
Geneva Protocol as excluding herbicides and incapacitating gases, 5 it was strongly rebuked by 
the United Nations General Assembly, which voted in an overwhelming majority to support a 
resolution that explicitly interprets the Protocol as prohibiting their use in war. 6 Indeed, in 1975, 
with the war in Vietnam winding down, the U.S. Congress ratified the Geneva Protocol with the 
explicit recognition that the treaty bars the use of herbicides and incapacitating gases in war 7 (see 
Washington Post 1974). Even with this recognition, however, the United States has continued to 
5 The Nixon Administration was attempting to push Congress to ratify the Geneva Protocol as part of a larger 
strategy to strengthen the norm against immediately lethal chemical weapons in order to limit the military capacities 
of weaker nations, but still wanted to maintain its own ability to use herbicides and incapacitating gases in Vietnam 
and in future wars (see Smith 1969). 
6 The vote on the resolution was 80-3, in which the only dissenting votes came from the United States, its 
Australian ally also fighting in Vietnam, and Portugal, a country that had recently employed herbicides in its war to 
maintain control over its African colony of Angola (Baxter and Buergenthal 1970). 
7 The Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, signed and ratified by the United States, also explicitly defines 
incapacitating gases used in war as banned chemical weapons. 
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use herbicides as a method of violence in counter-insurgency campaigns in numerous countries 
across the world in its "War on Drugs." 
What is, and what is not, a chemical weapon is therefore not as easy to determine as it 
might at first seem. Quite the contrary, the interpretation of whether or not a method of toxic 
violence should be declared a "chemical weapon" has much to do with politics and the structure 
of the world-system within which a national government acts. Nevertheless, as these cases make 
clear, whenever the United States has used toxic chemicals as a method of violence in overseas 
conflicts, it has faced both internal and external opposition and has been condemned for violating 
international humanitarian norms. In an effort to maintain the consent of critical constituencies-
both foreign and domestic-the United States has sought to legitimate this violence. 
Herbicides: Vietnam, 1961-1971 
From 1961 to 1971 the United States Air Force sprayed millions of gallons of herbicides over 
Vietnam and Laos, intending to defoliate vegetation to eliminate the cover it provided to enemy 
soldiers and to destroy "enemy" agricultural crops in hopes of creating food shortages 
(Buckingham 1982). From the start of this enterprise, the U.S. government was confronted with 
claims that it was using a chemical weapon. Indeed, some of these initial challenges came 
internally, when members of the Department of State counseled against using herbicides to 
destroy food crops. In one internal memo Edward Murrow (1962), the director of the U.S. 
Information Agency, privately warned that 
chemical and biological warfare are subjects which arouse emotional reactions at 
least as intense as those aroused by nuclear warfare [ ... ] No matter how 
reasonable our case may be [to utilize chemicals to destroy food crops]. I am 
convinced that we cannot persuade the world-particularly that large part of it 
which does not get enough to eat-that defoliation "is good for you." 
Likewise, Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1962), wrote to the President that "the use of strange 
chemical agents, to destroy crops, strikes at something basic implanted in human beings ( even if 
the people do not-as many will-fear that the chemical agents are also directly harmful to 
people)." 
When the U.S. defoliation and crop destruction programs were made public, criticism 
became widespread. U.S. House of Representative member Robert Kastenmeier (1963), for 
instance, wrote a letter of protest to President Kennedy, decrying the use of herbicides, which he 
specifically called a chemical weapon. Public criticism of these weapons came not just from the 
U.S. student antiwar movement, but also from well-recognized and outspoken scientists of the 
era, who regularly petitioned the government and otherwise spoke out against the military's use 
of herbicides in Vietnam, also classifying them as chemical weapons (New York Times 1966a; 
O'Toole 1967; Reinhold 1969). In response to these challenges, U.S. governmental officials 
worked to legitimate their contested weapons. 
Legitimating herbicides in Vietnam through defensive categorization. Through the 
technique of defensive categorization, officials deny that the military is using a condemned form 
of violence. They attempt to make such denials convincing by stressing how different a contested 
form of violence is compared to other types of violence that are universally reviled and deemed 
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impermissible. In the case of herbicides, officials sought to do this by claiming that the 
chemicals used in Vietnam were the same as those widely used for agricultural and industrial 
purposes around the world and therefore, it was implied, could not possibly be considered 
chemical weapons. 
For instance, when the Chiefs of Staff presented their proposal to President Kennedy to 
use herbicides for defoliation and crop destruction in Vietnam, asking for his approval, they were 
already practicing defensive categorization by claiming that the chemicals are "commercially 
produced in this country and have been used for years in industrial and agricultural plant growth 
clearance operations" (Gilpatrick 1961 ). Similarly, in preparation to legitimate the use of 
herbicides in war, a memo was sent out to instruct U.S. embassies on how to deal with press 
inquiries regarding defoliation. In the memo, the Department of State (1961) advised officials to 
tell reporters that the "operation involves use of material which are similar to those used 
everyday for clearing rights of way in the United States. As our people know from experience, 
these defoliants of the 2-4D variety [including Agent Orange] are not harmful to humans, 
animals, or the soil." 
This rhetorical strategy would continue to be used throughout the war. One example of 
defensive categorization comes from a 1965 New York Times article, which reads, "officials 
describe the crop destruction chemical as a commercial weed killer, identical with a popular 
brand that many Americans spray on their lawns. It is not poisonous, and officials say that any 
food that survives its deadening touch will not be toxic or unpalatable" (Mohr 1965). Another 
example comes from a press conference held in 1968, in which U.S. officials told reporters, "no 
chemical is in use here that has not been thoroughly tested and available on the American 
domestic market. [Officials] said that one of the agents sprayed from planes over Vietcong areas 
is a chemical popularly used to fight crabgrass in America" (Lescazee 1968). 
The logic of defensive categorization requires a very narrow interpretation of what 
constitutes a prohibited form of violence. In the case of chemical weapons, such a narrow 
interpretation means that a chemical weapon, in order to be defined as such, must cause direct, 
immediate, and intentional harm through exposure. The logic that U.S. officials were relying on 
in their practice of defensive categorization was made explicit in a letter sent by the Kennedy 
Administration in response to Representative Kastenmeier's letter, which had-as mentioned 
above-accused the U.S. government of using chemical weapons in Vietnam. In reply, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense William Bundy (1963) wrote that, "in the Republic of Vietnam, the use of 
chemical and biological weapons has not occurred, and the compromise of moral principles has 
not been an issue." This was true, he explained, because, 
As you are aware, chemical warfare as defined by international law requires 
injury to the physical person of the enemy. The chemicals that have been used are 
weed-killers of the same types ... used-especially by farmers-in the United 
States and other countries. They are commercially available in the United States 
and many other countries. They are not injurious to man, animals, or the soil. 
Despite such claims, there are many reasons why herbicides-as used by the United States in the 
war in Vietnam-could be considered chemical weapons. Certainly, they were used for their 
chemical toxicity and could reasonably be considered "poisonous or other gases" banned by the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925. The actual text of the document does not include, after all, a 
stipulation that in order to be considered a prohibited chemical weapon, a toxic weapon used in 
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war must cause direct harm to a person and could not be a commercially available product, 
despite the Kennedy Administration's interpretation of the treaty. 
Regardless, while it is now known that these herbicides produced tremendous physical 
harm to successive generations of people in Vietnam, due to their carcinogenic and teratogenic 
effects, this was not common knowledge at the time. 8 But Kennedy Administration officials 
must have known that destroying food crops with chemicals - in effect creating hunger and 
potentially killing persons through starvation - was causing a kind of "injury to the physical 
person of the enemy," and to civilians alike. 9 In this sense, using herbicides to destroy food crops 
could constitute the use of a chemical weapon even by the Kennedy Administration's own 
narrow interpretation. But such logic undermines the practice of defensive categorization, and 
was therefore suppressed and certainly not made part of an official discourse. 
Historical records indicate that defensive categorization was a primary means by which 
the United States sought to legitimate its use of herbicides in Southeast Asia. But it was far from 
the only legitimating technique U.S. officials used. They also employed a method of surrogacy. 
Legitimating herbicides in Vietnam through surrogacy. Through the legitimating 
strategy of surrogacy, the U.S. government directs other nations or armed groups to utilize 
weapons or violent practices that may breach international humanitarian norms as a means of 
cloaking its own culpability (Bonds 2012). U.S. officials elected to utilize this legitimating 
method when they first decided not to conduct herbicidal crop destruction missions directly, but 
to, instead, provision the Republic of Vietnam's military with the equipment and technical 
knowledge necessary to carry them out. A memo from the Department of Defense to President 
Kennedy, for instance, stated, "American participation would be as unobtrusive as possible and 
limited to technical advice and assistance" (McNamara 1962). So, while the first crop destruction 
missions utilized U.S. supplied helicopters, herbicides, spray equipment, and technical advice, 
they were conducted by Southern Vietnamese pilots and soldiers (Joint Chiefs 1963). 
Direct surrogacy, however, was not a long-term practice in that, by 1964, the U.S. 
government began carrying out crop destruction missions in Vietnam and Laos itself because its 
fixed-winged aircraft could spray greater areas, had a longer range, and were not as vulnerable to 
enemy small-arms fire compared to the U.S.-supplied Vietnamese helicopters (Buckingham 
1982). Regardless, officials misleadingly claimed, up until 1965, that U.S. aircraft were not 
involved in any crop destruction missions (Raymond 1965). 10 But U.S. officials did not only 
attempt to use strategies of defensive categorization and surrogacy to legitimate the use of 
herbicides in Vietnam, they also employed a humanitizing discourse. 
8 The major manufacturers of 2,4,5-T, which is the major component of Agent Orange and other herbicides used by 
the government in Vietnam, were aware of the presence of dioxins in this widely-used herbicide, but they did not 
disclose this information to the public. While Dow Chemical claimed, in its legal defense against a lawsuit filed by 
Vietnam War veterans, that it told Secretary of Defense McNamara about dioxin contamination in 1965, this 
remains unsubstantiated (Chicago Tribune 1983). 
9 Members of the Kennedy Administration knew, for example, that the first major crop destruction campaign had, by 
the military's estimate, destroyed enough rice to feed 1,000 people for an entire year (Joint Chiefs 1963). 
10 US. crop destruction missions were, to some extent, an open secret by 1965 (Mohr 1965). But it was not until 
1966 that the US. government took responsibility for the program, when it released an official statement in response 
to the hunger strike of a landscape architect living in New Yark, who demanded in his protest that the government 
inform the public about its crop destruction campaigns (New Yark Times l 966b ). 
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The use of humanitizing discourse to legitimate herbicides in the Vietnam War. 
Through the use of humanitizing discourse, U.S. officials may attempt to legitimate contested 
forms of violence by emphasizing the care taken to avoid civilian harms. This tactic was often 
used during the Vietnam War, where U.S. officials regularly stressed how careful military 
planners were to avoid directly spraying civilians or their crops. Numerous examples can be 
cited. For instance, a news reporter for the New York Times wrote in 1965, "officials say that 
elaborate pains are taken to prevent defoliants from falling on areas inhabited by friendly 
civilians" (Beecher 1965). An article the following year stated, "the key to the defoliation 
question is discrimination. If the weapon is used discriminately, it can be effective. At least this 
is the official appraisal here of the strictly technical aspects of the United States' defoliation 
program [ ... ] Defoliation is carefully controlled" (Oka 1966). Officials also repeatedly stressed 
that care was taken to ensure that herbicides were only used to destroy food crops in areas 
"known to be used to produce food for Vietcong military units" (Mohr 1965). For instance, a 
question and answer sheet distributed by the State Department to advise U.S. embassies around 
the world on how, among other things, to speak about the military's use of herbicides included 
this hypothetical exchange: 
QUESTION: How can you justify the deliberate destruction of rice fields and 
other crops by herbicide spraying? Isn't this taking food from the mouths of poor 
farmers and their families, and gaining nothing but hostility? 
ANSWER: The destruction of rice fields and other crops impedes the Viet Cong. 
Crop destruction has taken place only in areas fully controlled by the Viet Cong 
for a considerable period of time. There the harvested foodstuffs, used solely by 
the Viet Cong, sustain the attackers in their military operations and their acts of 
terrorism against innocent civilians (USIA 1967: 18). 
Later attempts were made to convince the public that civilians were not harmed by the use of 
herbicides to destroy food crops because, officials stressed, the U.S. only targeted cultivated 
lands in "remote" areas. For example, an article from the New York Times states that crop 
destruction campaigns "are targeted on pockets of land cultivated by enemy troops in the largely 
unpopulated areas of central Vietnam. No food denial mission has been flown in an area with a 
goverrnnent-registered population of more than 20 people per square mile, the officials said" 
(Lescaze 1968). 
The humanitizing discourse used by U.S. officials, however, was not an accurate 
reflection of real world events. Geographical estimates since the War-using archived flight 
records of spray missions-contradicted claims that U.S. officials exercised a great deal of 
caution to avoid spraying civilians (Stellman et al. 2003). Quite the contrary: records show that 
3,181 hamlets were directly sprayed. Based on military estimates of the populations of these 
communities, a minimum of 2.1 million persons were under U.S. planes that were showering 
down Agent Orange and other herbicides 11 (Stellman et al. 2003). Further contradicting claims 
of care and discretion to avoid civilian harm, studies commissioned by the U.S. military itself 
during the Vietnam War found that herbicidal crop destruction campaigns largely affected 
civilian farmers (Bretts and Denton 1967). Internally, despite the military's humanitizing 
11 This estimate does not include the hundreds of thousands of people who were directly sprayed while traveling 
along roads, working in fields, or otherwise outside their communities but still underneath US. planes. 
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discourse, officials acknowledged that "available evidence indicates that the civilian population 
in VC [Vietcong] controlled areas bears the brunt of these operations" (Warren 1968: 27). So, 
taken together, defensive categorization, surrogacy, and the use of a humanitizing discourse were 
all used to legitimate the military's use of herbicides in Vietnam and Laos. Many of these same 
tactics, as we will see, were also used to legitimate the use of incapacitating gases used in the 
War. 
Incapacitating Gases: Vietnam 1965-1972 
The Johnson Administration was taken by surprise by the international and domestic controversy 
created after the U.S. military attacked villages in the Boi Loi Woods in Vietnam in an attempt to 
defeat enemy soldiers and push civilians into "strategic hamlets," or government controlled 
refugee camps. U.S. jets first bombed the area, then sprayed surrounding forests and rubber 
plantations with herbicides, and then inundated the area with napalm and incendiary bombs in an 
ultimately unsuccessful attempt to create a self-sustaining forest fire that would destroy any tree 
that could provide enemy cover (Buckingham 1982). The uproar created by this military 
campaign did not, surprisingly, focus on the U.S. military's campaign of near total destruction in 
the Boi Loi Woods. Rather, the controversy focused more specifically on the U.S.'s use of tear 
gases and other incapacitating agents on civilians to force them from their homes and villages in 
the midst of the bombardment. 
The Johnson Administration quickly learned that the use of incapacitating gases would be 
decried as the use of a chemical weapon. The New York Times, for instance, reported that this 
was the, "first time the U.S. has used gas in warfare since WWI" (Frankel 1965). Internationally, 
the United States faced immediate criticism from members of Britain's governing Labor Party, 
which had otherwise been an important international supporter of the U.S. war in Vietnam 
(Bruce 1965). Domestically, democratic Senator Frank Morse told reporters that the tactic was 
"justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world" (Frankel 1965). U.S. Senator 
Mike Mansfield, a powerful democratic ally in the Senate, made a more quiet protest in the form 
of a letter to the President, questioning whether the use of incapacitating gases may do more 
harm to the U.S. in regard to international opinion than any military advantages it could give in 
Vietnam (Johnson 1965). And the U.S. government would face enduring opposition from the 
scientists and scientific organizations advocating against the use of herbicides in Vietnam, who 
were just as opposed to the use of incapacitating gases, which they also condemned as a type of 
chemical weapon (see O'Toole 1969). 
Though these gases were themselves nonlethal, they were primarily used by the U.S. 
military as a means of forcing suspected enemies out of bunkers, trenches, and other protected 
areas so they could be more easily killed by conventional weaponry. Used as such, the U.S. 
government determined that these gases were a very important military tool that it would 
continue to use, despite international and domestic condemnation (Bundy 1965). But in doing so, 
U.S. officials sought to obscure the gap between humanitarian norms and actual military policy. 
Legitimating incapacitating gases through defensive categorization. Through defensive 
categorization, officials claimed that such gases were simply "riot control gases" or tear gases 
commonly used by police around the world, and therefore could not plausibly be considered 
chemical weapons. For instance, when President Johnson met with the UK Foreign Secretary in 
an attempt to dampen the international uproar after the U.S. military sprayed incapacitating gases 
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on civilians in the Boi Loi Woods, he claimed that "the gas was one in common use by our own 
police forces, was frequently employed for quelling riots, and was stocked by many countries" 
(Bruce 1965). Likewise, Secretary of State Rusk gave a press conference after the Boi Loi 
Woods attack, in which he stated, 
The shadow of gas warfare has been raised in connection with these incidents. 
That is not involved. We are not embarking upon gas warfare in Viet-Nam ... We 
are not talking about gas that is prohibited by the Geneva Convention of 1925, or 
any other understandings about the use of gas. We are talking about a gas which 
has been commonly adopted by the police forces of the world as riot control 
agents-gases that are available commercially, and have been used on many 
occasions, some in this country; and on many occasions in other countries. 
U.S. officials would use this rhetorical strategy in successive years, and indeed throughout the 
war, to legitimate the use of incapacitating gases (USIA 1965). 
For instance, a question-and-answer sheet put out by the U.S. Information Agency, 
created to help U.S. embassies around the world prepare for press inquiries, includes this 
hypothetical dialogue: 
QUESTION: Why do you use poison gas against the other side? Don't you 
adhere to the Geneva Conventions which prohibit this kind of warfare? 
ANSWER: Neither the RVN [Republic of Vietnam] nor any of its allies has used 
poison gas ... Tear gas is a nontoxic agent which police forces use for riot control 
in almost every country of the world as a means of limiting violence and 
casualties ... Its use is not contrary to any Geneva Convention (USIA 1967: 19). 
As the examples above demonstrate, the Johnson Administration, and later the Nixon 
Administration, consistently sought to legitimate incapacitating gases by claiming that they were 
commercially available and widely used for law-enforcement purposes, and therefore should not 
be considered a type of weapon banned by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. There are 
inconsistencies, however, with such claims-making. First, the actual context in Vietnam was very 
different than that to which it was being compared: the U.S. was not using tear gas in police 
actions but in military campaigns where it was simultaneously dropping bombs and firing 
bullets. Second, the scale was very different between police use of tear gas, which implies 
infrequent and sporadic use, and the regular and sustained use of incapacitants by the U.S. 
military in Vietnam, which regularly deployed them by helicopter, high powered fans, and 
through shells and bombs. 12 Finally, while the U.S. regularly claimed that these incapacitant 
gases were the same tear gases used by police around the world, officials later acknowledged that 
much of the gas used by the military was a "super" tear gas created to last longer in the 
environment and was not actually used by police (Committee on Foreign Relations 1971). 
Furthermore, U.S. forces also, at least initially in the war, often added a nauseating agent that 
could induce vomiting for up to two hours after contact (Frankel 1965; Margolis 1965). Archival 
evidence further shows that the Johnson Administration knew as early as 1965 that the tear gases 
12 The US. military itself estimated that it had purchased and transported more than 13,000,000 pounds of 
incapacitant gases for use in Southeast Asia between 1964 and 1969. A Harvard biologist at the time estimated that 
this was enough gas to effectively cover 80,000 square miles (Wilson 1969). 
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used in Vietnam and those used in domestic police work were very different (Horning 1965), but 
Administration officials nevertheless practiced defensive categorization by claiming that the two 
were one and the same. 
These above inconsistencies cast doubt about U.S. claims that its use ofincapacitant-type 
gases should not be considered a type of chemical warfare banned by the Geneva Protocol. The 
text of the Protocol and the context in which it was written raise further misgivings. After all, the 
Protocol seeks to ban "asphyxiating" gases, and tear gases certainly seem to fall into this 
category because they induce coughing and make breathing more difficult. And while the U.S. 
hoped to promote a narrow definition of the Geneva Protocol as banning only lethal chemicals, 
the drafters of the Protocol never made such a specification and likely had non-lethal 
incapacitants in mind. They were, after all, the first chemical gases used in World War One and 
constituted up to a tenth of all chemical agents used throughout the war (Coleman 2005). Despite 
these inconsistencies, defensive categorization was likely an effective tool used to legitimate 
toxic violence in the Vietnam War, as was the use of a humanitizing discourse. 
The use of humanitizing discourse to legitimate incapacitating gases in Vietnam. U.S. 
officials also regularly sought to defend the use of incapacitating gases in Vietnam with a 
humanitizing discourse, which did not stress so much the care taken to avoid civilian exposure, 
as with herbicides, but instead stressed that the use of this contested weapon may have 
humanitarian benefits. This rhetorical strategy is well expressed in a 1965 New York Times 
article that reads, "US officials claimed gassing the village was more humane than bombing it or 
sending in a barrage of artillery" (Frankel 1965). Throughout the War, officials-including 
President Johnson-argued that the use of incapacitating gas was "authorized in an effort to save 
lives" (Johnson 1965) and that the gas did little harm to persons, having "only a temporary 
effect" (Committee on Foreign Relations 1971) of "nausea, choking, and copious weeping" 
(Washington Post 1972). According to this humanitizing discourse, "these riot control agents 
frequently make it possible to capture enemy soldiers unharmed and are particularly useful in 
reducing civilian casualties when the enemy has infiltrated into populations centers or built-up 
areas or is believed to be holding civilian hostages" ( official quoted in The New York Times 
1969). 
Despite these claims, the historical record indicates that incapacitating gases were not 
primarily used to achieve humanitarian goals, but were used because they increased the capacity 
of the U.S. military to kill suspected enemies. A former official in the Johnson Administration, 
George Bunn, who participated in constructing the humanitarian rationale for the use of 
incapacitants later acknowledged this in Congressional testimony. He stated that "the 
humanitarian justification given to the United Nations was not observed in practice ... From 
saving civilian and enemy lives-tear gas had become simply a better killer-at least in some of 
its uses" (Committee on Foreign Relations 1971: 54). This same point was made much earlier, in 
1965, by a former administration official who complained to The New York Times (1965) that 
"the American use of tear gas in Vietnam does not match the humanitarian justification for its 
use given by the government." The former official was further quoted as saying, "large numbers 
of tear gas grenades have been dropped on Vietcong strongholds from helicopters that were 
followed by B-52s dropping explosive or anti-personnel-fragmentation bombs" (The New York 
Times 1965). In other words, the United States was not using incapacitants to save lives. It was 
using them, much like in World War I, to push soldiers out of protected positions so they could 
be more easily killed and their positions could be overtaken using more conventional weapons. 
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The United States, after all, was dropping 270-pound bombs, grenades, and artillery shells filled 
with incapacitants along with, not instead of, lethal weapons. The previously discussed 1965 
incident at the Boi Loi Woods is a case in point. While the United States sprayed tear gas and 
nauseating gases into hamlets, it did this within a context of aerial bombardment using napalm 
and cluster bombs (Buckingham 1982). 
Herbicides: International "War on Drugs," 1970-Present 
The aerial eradication of drug crops, accomplished by spraying herbicides from fixed-wing 
aircraft and helicopters in foreign countries, has been a longstanding component of U.S. foreign 
policy (Buxton 2006). The history of this policy dates back to the Nixon Administration, which 
provided helicopters, herbicides, and technical assistance in 1970 to the Mexican government to 
destroy marijuana and poppy fields (The New York Times 1970). Since that time, the United 
States has provided support for, or actually operated, anti-drug herbicidal campaigns in Burma, 
Guatemala, Panama, Belize, and Pakistan (Courier-Mail 1988). The United States also began 
providing major support in 2000 for drug eradication in Colombia through a multi-billion dollar 
military aid package to support the government's drug suppression and counter-insurgency 
efforts known as "Plan Colombia." Today the United States continues to fund the private 
company DynCorp to conduct aerial drug crop eradication in Colombia. 13 
While the United States' long-standing policy regarding the use of herbicidal chemicals 
during the "War on Drugs" has not been widely criticized as a violation of international 
normative commitments regarding chemical weapons, the case below makes clear that it 
certainly is a form of toxic violence and has been strongly criticized by international human 
rights organizations (Robberson 2001 ), peace and environmental NGOs (Earth justice 2002; 
Witness for Peace 2002), and has been treated with some suspicion and criticism by the U.S. 
Congress (Pauker 2003). As such, U.S. officials have worked to legitimate the use of herbicides 
as a weapon in the "War on Drugs" in familiar ways. 
Legitimating herbicides for drug eradication through defensive categorization. U.S. 
officials have sought to legitimate the use of herbicides in the "War on Drugs" as if they were 
simply chemical tools used for conventional agricultural purposes, stating for instance "that the 
coca spraying is being carried out in accordance with regulatory controls required by the 
Environmental Protection Agency as labeled for use in the United States" (State Department 
2002; see also State Department 2006). However, their use in these circumstances is better 
defined as that of a toxic weapon. 
That herbicides used to destroy drug crops are a kind of weapon, and not simply an 
agricultural tool, is made clearer when examining the broader context in which they are used: 
often in the midst of wars, counter-insurgency campaigns, or other social conflicts. In particular, 
there has been no clear defining line between U.S. anti-drug policies and counter-insurgency 
foreign policy in the U.S.-backed drug eradication programs of Mexico, Burma (now Myanmar), 
and Colombia (Buxton 2006). Revolutions and armed rebellions, after all, require the provision 
of weapons. In the absence of superpower patrons, revolutionaries may look to use "highly 
lootable" resources for funding, such as drug crops (Le Billon 2001 ). Or, on the other hand, the 
13 More than three million acres in Colombia have been sprayed with herbicides since Plan Colombia was put into 
effect (EarthJustice 2011). Colombia's Council for Human Rights and Displacement estimates that aerial fumigation 
displaced more than 70,000 people in the first two years of spraying alone (Dion and Russler 2008). 
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capacity to grow and profit from drugs crops may create conditions in which organizations arm 
themselves and fight battles in order to protect their illicit source of wealth (Le Billon 2001). In 
either case, efforts to eradicate drug crops are not simply counter-drug tactics, but as a matter of 
intention or as a matter of effect, are also military campaigns in larger armed conflicts. In the 
context of the "War on Drugs," herbicides have been used as a weapon in the sense that they are 
an implement of force used against the will of and despite the resistance of others. Paying further 
attention to U.S.-backed drug eradication in Colombia makes this point clear. 
U.S.-backed drug eradication campaigns in Colombia since the 1990s occurred during a 
period in which the nation's government was engaged in a full-scale counter-insurgency war, in 
which its main adversaries were communist rebel forces that were profiting from drug 
production and trafficking (GAO 2008). It was in this context that the United States spent $4.9 
billion dollars on "Plan Colombia" between 2000-2006 in order to provide "the Colombian 
military and National Police with a range of capabilities, primarily air mobility, needed to pursue 
Plan Colombia's counternarcotics and security objectives" (GAO 2008: 5). This "air mobility" 
came primarily in the form of the increased capacity to destroy drug crops with herbicides from 
above. The communist forces in Colombia consequently sought to protect drug crops from 
destruction by attempting to take down spray planes. As a result, efforts to destroy drug crops 
from the air in Colombia resembled military strikes much more than they resembled more 
conventional agricultural uses of herbicides, as the below quote from a U.S. Congressional report 
describes: 
A typical spray m1ss1on consists of four spray aircraft supported by helicopter 
gunships to protect the spray aircraft along with a search and rescue helicopter to 
rescue downed pilots and crew. In addition, ground security is provided as needed 
by the Army Counternarcotics Brigade. (GAO 2008: 39) 
Because herbicides in the "War on Drugs" were used as a kind of weapon in violent 
conflicts, their human health impacts are likely much more extensive than when used in 
conventional agriculture. For instance, the U.S. State Department practices defensive 
categorization by asserting that its use of the herbicide glyphosate in Colombia, which is the 
active ingredient in the commercially available herbicide "Round-Up®," is consistent with its 
commercial use in the United States. However, such a comparison ignores an additional 
chemical agent called "cosmo-flux" that makes the herbicide more effective, but is not 
domestically available in stores (EPA 2002). Moreover, higher concentrations of glyphosate are 
used in Colombian drug eradication than are allowed in U.S. agriculture (Pauker 2003). And 
because the aircraft deploying herbicides often come under enemy fire, they fly at higher 
altitudes and faster speeds than they would fly when "crop dusting" in the United States, 
increasing the extent of herbicidal drift and other unintended applications of herbicides that 
contaminate water and destroy plants in adjacent legal cropland, forests, and wetlands (Pauker 
2003). Beyond defensive categorization, the U.S. has used a humanitizing discourse to legitimate 
its toxic weaponry used in the "War on Drugs." 
The use of humanitizing discourse in drug eradication campaigns. In order to convince 
critics that its herbicide campaign in Colombia was not adversely affecting civilians, the State 
Department required the government of Colombia to "compensate growers for legal crops 
sprayed in error" (State Department 2003). This presumably would be quite common because the 
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planes applying herbicides in Colombia move at a much faster speed and at a much higher 
altitude than planes would fly under normal agricultural circumstances, in order to avoid being 
shot down by enemy fire (EPA 2002). Press (Forero 2001) and NGO accounts (Earth Justice 
2002; Witness for Peace 2002), as well as the findings of the government of Columbia's Human 
Rights Ombudsman (Robberson 2001), attest to the frequency of this problem. 
The U.S.-instituted program, however, appears to be more hollow rhetoric than an actual 
plan to compensate people for their losses due to errant herbicides. According to the U.S. State 
Department in 2003, the government of Colombia had received 4,329 complaints of legal crops 
wrongly destroyed by the aerial application of herbicides. The Colombian government claimed it 
investigated 2,745 of these cases and found that all but five were fraudulent (State Department 
2003 ). The situation in 2007 was no better; after having received a total of 6, 778 complaints 
since the program's inception, the government of Colombia denied compensation to all but 43. 
The government of Colombia determined that the several thousand other cases are "false" 
claims, in which growers of coca plants have allegedly sought compensation for their destroyed 
drug crops (State Department 2003, 2007). It must be taken into account, however, that the 
government of Colombia is regularly rated poorly in terms of corruption and has often been 
accused of committing human rights abuses against its citizens (Livingston 2004). Taken in this 
context, this U.S.-required program, undertaken by the Colombian Government, is a 
humanitizing discourse used in hopes of satisfying critics, even if it has not actually rectified 
human rights abuses committed through the destruction of legal crops through the aerial 
application of herbicides. 
Surrogacy and herbicides in drug eradication campaigns. Through surrogacy, the 
United States implements policies that violate international humanitarian norms, but it does so in 
such a way to create the impression that other national governments are ultimately responsible. 
This is despite the fact that the United States may fund such campaigns and provide the technical 
means to carry them out. For instance, by 1980, the U.S. government had provided Mexico a 
total of 70 million dollars in equipment and technical assistance, including spray equipment, 41 
helicopters, and 22 spotter planes to conduct aerial drug eradication campaigns (Riding 1980). 
The United States continued providing the Mexican government herbicides, aircraft, and funding 
throughout the 1980s, and eventually even supplied pilots to conduct aerial missions to destroy 
illegal crops. Under Plan Colombia, the United States also provided substantial support for drug 
eradication. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2008: 39), the United 
States has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support for drug fumigation in the form of 
"U.S.-owned spray aircraft and helicopters, as well as contractor support to help fly, maintain, 
and operate these assets at forward operating locations throughout Colombia." 
The United States, through surrogacy, can distance itself and maintain plausible 
deniability of human rights violations that occur through such campaigns, even if they were only 
begrudgingly accepted by host countries. Mexico, for instance, initially refused U.S. proposals 
for herbicidal drug eradication in the 1970s, and only submitted to them after the United States 
instituted an economically crippling border blockade (Onis 1969; Buxton 2006). Colombia, 
while undertaking some U.S.-supported herbicidal drug eradication in the 1990s, initially refused 
U.S. plans to dramatically increase fumigation. The country's leaders buckled to U.S. pressure, 
however, after Colombia was placed on a list of non-cooperating countries in the drug war, 
which affected the nation's ability to receive international loans and other forms of assistance 
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(Buxton 2006). Surrogacy, then, is another important means by which U.S. officials have sought 
to legitimate toxic violence in the "War on Drugs." 
Legitimation and the Contradictions of Hegemony 
Hegemony does not simply mean military and economic dominance. Rather, it means that a 
hegemon must exert its influence over the world-system through some combination of coercion 
and consent (Arrighi and Silver 1999). The cases in this article contribute to our understanding of 
hegemony by demonstrating that these two forms of power do not only complement one another, 
but that they are also potentially contradictory. On the one hand, the United States has sought to 
exert global moral leadership by proclaiming the "rights of the people" and by promising a 
liberal reformative program toward their full provision (Wallerstein 1995). Even in times of war, 
the United States has experienced pressure to comply with international norms that outlaw and 
stigmatize certain acts of violence that are identified as especially cruel or harmful to civilians. 
On the other hand, the United States has regularly used military violence across the globe 
throughout its tenure as hegemon in order to maintain its leading position within a system of 
global inequalities that can only be maintained through coercive force. The question is, then: 
which is most fundamental to hegemony, coercion or consent, when the two seem at odds with 
one another? 
This already difficult question is complicated further when we account for the fact that 
powerful nations are not only passive recipients of global political culture, but are also active co-
creators of global norms. An additional question here, then, is whether, after having co-
constructed a global norm as a means of controlling the military power of weaker nations-as in 
the case of landmines, nuclear weapons, or chemical weapons-a hegemonic power will itself be 
pressured to comply. Social constructionist theorists in international relations have argued for the 
affirmative (Price 1997; Tannenwald 2007; Sikkink 2011). More critical scholars of 
humanitarian arms control efforts are likely to disagree (see Cooper 2011; Stavrianakis 2011). 
The cases here, however, show some evidence in support of both positions, though in the end a 
hegemonic power's need to utilize militarily effective power likely trumps its need to exercise 
cultural leadership, which might be diminished by violating long-standing and widely-shared 
humanitarian norms. 
The examination of U.S. policy on toxic violence demonstrates that, on one hand, the 
United States has complied with the global ban on chemical weapons by abdicating the use of 
immediately lethal gases, even in situations when their use may have been militarily effective 
(Price 1997). It was likely in the hegemonic interest of the United States to abandon such 
weapons because, since 1969, it has undertaken efforts-along with other powerful nations-to 
strengthen the "chemical weapons taboo" and stigmatize them as "weapons of the weak" in order 
promote the more conventional military power of nations in the global North (Price 1997). On 
the other hand, however, the United States has not strictly complied with the ban on chemical 
weapons. Rather, it has regularly used toxic violence-albeit utilizing types of chemicals that are 
not immediately lethal-to achieve geopolitical goals since 1961. 
The fact that, when doing so, the United States has sought to either hide or exempt its 
own use of toxic violence from the chemical weapons ban is significant. It means that, while a 
hegemon's ability to utilize coercive violence may be of ultimate importance, its need to attain 
the consent of the governed in global affairs does not go away. These cases demonstrate that the 
Hegemony And Humanitarian Norms 100 
United States has consistently used three main techniques to legitimate its use of toxic violence. 
Through the strategy of defensive categorization, U.S. officials claim that the military's use of a 
contested form of violence is very different from the kinds of violence that have been prohibited 
through international treaty-making. To make this case, they work to normalize this violence by 
stressing its routine and commonplace nature. U.S. officials also seek to legitimate contested 
forms of violence by using a humanitizing discourse, through which they either stress the care 
taken to avoid harm or argue that, in fact, the use of a controversial form of violence has 
humanitarian benefits. Through surrogacy, the U.S. government denies responsibility for the 
results of contested forms of violence used by client states, even if U.S. officials provided the 
resources and direction to carry it out. It is through these legitimating mechanisms that U.S. 
officials have sought to manage the contradictions of hegemony, in order to obscure the 
difference between professed appreciation of liberal or humanitarian norms and the violent 
military practices used to maintain a starkly unequal world. 
Other researchers studying the legitimation of state violence might find the interpretive 
categories introduced here useful, as this brief application to the U.S. "War on Terror" shows. 
For one, U.S. officials certainly practiced defensive categorization in response to domestic and 
international criticism that the nation was using torture as a method of gathering intelligence. 
"The U.S. does not torture" proclaimed President Bush (2005), while other officials stressed the 
supposedly routine and commonplace nature of the "enhanced interrogations" used by the United 
States (Rejali 2007). And the United States and its allies have relied upon a humanitizing 
discourse to justify its military occupations in other nations during the "War on Terror" 
(Bricmont 2006). In Iraq, after no chemical weapons were found, the war was justified as being 
fought to bring democracy to the people of Iraq and to protect them from a ruthless tyrant. And 
the war and occupation in Afghanistan has been legitimated in terms of furthering women's 
rights. Likewise, despite evidence that the U.S. use of drones to carry out targeted assassinations 
has resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths (Woods and Lamb 2012; Ackerman 2013), U.S. 
officials continue to legitimate this violence by stressing the "precision" of these weapons and 
the "care" taken to avoid harming non-target persons (see Brennan 2012). 
Finally, the United States has used the technique of surrogacy as a legitimating tool as 
well during the "War on Terror." For instance, leaked diplomatic cables between the Yemeni 
government and the United States reveal that Yemeni officials were willingly claiming 
responsibility for missiles fired into the country by the U.S. aimed at insurgent groups (Amnesty 
International 2010). This was certainly in the interest of the Yemeni government, which did not 
have to disclose to its citizens that the United States was directly attacking rebels within its 
borders and infringing on Yemeni sovereignty. This was also in the interest of the United States 
when, for instance, in one 2009 attack, it did not have to take responsibility for the cluster bombs 
that killed 41 civilians, including 21 children (Amnesty International 2010). Of course, 
researchers studying the legitimation of violence outside a U.S. context may also find this 
typology useful, because practically all states, to a greater or lesser degree, work to secure 
geopolitical interests using military violence that is not entirely consistent with global 
humanitarian norms. These states, too, might utilize the techniques of defensive categorization, 
humanitizing discourse, and surrogacy in hopes of distancing themselves from, justifying, or 
explaining away stigmatized forms of violence. 
In conclusion, it is important to note that there is general agreement among world-
systems researchers that U.S. hegemony is expiring, if not already expired years ago. What this 
means in terms of U.S. military violence is far from certain. On one hand, it might mean that the 
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United States will increasingly institute policies of "adjustment and accommodation" to other 
rising economic and political powers (Arrighi 2010). In such a situation, the U.S. government 
may be less likely to use egregious forms of violence in order to secure political and economic 
goals. This may be especially so in the wake of the "human rights revolution" of the past thirty 
years (see, for instance, Risse et al. 1999). Indeed, there is some evidence of increasing U.S. 
compliance with global norms over the course of time in U.S. toxic violence policy. While at the 
height of its economic and political power, the United States used toxic weapons at an incredible 
scale during the Vietnam War, showering herbicides across entire landscapes in an attempt to 
destroy whole forests and to poison crops that fed hundreds of thousands, while also using 
enormous quantities of incapacitating gases to increase the lethality of artillery and aerial 
bombardment campaigns. It is hard to imagine the United States using toxic violence on this 
scale at the current historical moment. And while the United States continues to fund the aerial 
fumigation of drug crops in Colombia, this use of toxic violence also seems to be waning. For 
instance, while the U.S. government sought to instigate a program of aerial fumigation to destroy 
poppy crops in Afghanistan used to make opium, it eventually had to abandon its plan due to 
strong opposition from the national government of Afghanistan and the United States' NATO 
allies 14 (Landay 2007). 
Rather than instituting a program of "adjustment and accommodation," however, another 
possibility is that the U.S. will instead attempt to re-impose its will on the world-system 
primarily through its military might, regardless of its flagging economy (Wallerstein 2003; 
Arrighi 2010). In such a situation, compliance with international humanitarian norms would 
likely be cast aside if they interfered with the United States' ability to utilize militarily effective 
violence. While this study of U.S. chemical weapons policy provides no evidence indicating that 
such a situation is likely in the near future, other world events suggest that it remains a distinct 
possibility. Under such circumstances, we should expect U.S. officials to use many of the same 
legitimating techniques identified here. 
14 The United States instead carried out a program of manual poppy eradication, which it ceased in 2009. This work 
has been carried forward by the United Kingdom and the Government of Afghanistan (Fanner 2009). 
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